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When I was ﬁrst invited to talk, in London, about“What’s happening in Scotland”, I’m afraid mymind turned to that scene towards the end of
Macbeth set in England, “Before the King’s Palace”.
Shortly, Ross arrives and poor Macduff asks: “Stands
Scotland where it did?” And Ross has to reply: “Alas, poor
country!” And then adds a tale full of sighs and groans and
shrieks. I may have the occasional sigh or groan or even
shriek but, happily, I was also reminded of the comment of
the Lord President of the Court of Session on March 11,
2008 in evidence to the Justice Committee of the Scottish
Parliament. He said: “We live in pleasant times.” That is
to quote him out of context. He was explaining to the
Justice Committee that, in these pleasant times, a formal
guarantee of judicial independence might not be required.
He was acknowledging, however, that times might not
always be pleasant and that, in those circumstances a
statutory guarantee might then be important.
For some, these are pleasant times. I think, in particular, of
the Scottish First Minister Alex Salmond and his ministers,
the Government of Scotland since May 2007. Admittedly,
Glenrothes last month reduced the pleasantness of
Glasgow East in July 2008. Despite Glenrothes, things
have been distinctly less pleasant and much harder work
for Prime Minister Gordon Brown.
My task tonight is to focus on public law rather than
politics, although I shall have to say a little in a minute
about the impact of current political developments on
governance under devolution. What I want to do is to
extract from these developments a selective account of the
impact of the ten years of devolution on the development
of constitutional law and public law in general in the
United Kingdom as a whole.
My argument will be, as indicated by the rather clichéd
“sum of its parts” of the title of my lecture, that the
devolution of power to the Scottish Parliament and the
Scottish Executive since 1998/99 – quite unlike, for
instance, the 50 years of Stormont Government in
Northern Ireland – has had an important impact on the
general UK reform agenda. I am not for a minute saying
that Northern Ireland and Ireland itself in the period
1922-72 had no effect on UK politics and government. Of
course they did – but in ways which, for the most part, were
conﬁned to the resolution of the Northern Ireland
question itself – whether separately or whether, as with
the report of the Kilbrandon Royal Commission on the
Constitution in 1973, in a wider UK context.
I think the impact of Scottish devolution has been
different. With a particular focus on the UK Bill of Rights
debate and the question of the UK Supreme Court, I want
to suggest that the particular conditions of devolution in
Scotland – accentuated but not wholly dependent upon the
results of the Scottish Parliament elections of 2007 – are
having a limiting, if not at times a paralysing, effect on
constitutional debate. It is the particular mix of
constitutional, legal and political conditions which creates
the difﬁculty. It does, of course, remain the case that, in a
formal sense, the UK Parliament (subject to the
qualiﬁcations expressed by their Lordships in R (Jackson) v
Attorney General [2006] 1 AC 262) remains supreme. In a
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less formal sense, there may still be some lingering truth in
the claim that “power devolved is power retained”. But for
most practical purposes we have to acknowledge that
devolution has delivered a new constitutional environment
which places constraints (which may or may not be a good
thing) on the central government and Parliament. This
may seem obvious but it is not, I think, fully appreciated.
There are a number of factors.
There are, ﬁrst, the powers formally devolved. Coupled
with the obligations which ﬂow from the Sewel
convention, these effectively leave many areas of
constitutional activity beyond the reach of the UK
Government and Parliament acting alone. They also create
the tricky areas where the boundaries of reserved and
devolved power are less than clear, where, for instance,
reserved immigration powers overlap with devolved areas
of social provision. And the example recently highlighted in
the UK Government’s submission to the Calman
Commission on Scottish Devolution where reserved
powers of energy (including nuclear) provision overlap
with devolved powers of land use and development control.
It is apparent that UK ministers ﬁnd some of these
overlaps irksome and seek readjustments in a revision of
the Scotland Act settlement.
I’ll mention later some overlaps affecting the
administration of justice in Scotland. Consequences of a
particularly interesting kind for lawyers arise in the delivery
of reserved services through a substantially devolved legal
system.
Then, secondly, there is a close connection between the
powers constitutionally devolved and the resulting politics of
devolution. In the ﬁrst place, there is no rowing back.
There are too many beneﬁciaries of devolution – right
across the political party spectrum – to contemplate a
substantial redistribution of powers back to the centre
(although there may be some tweaking in that direction, as
sought by the UK Government in relation to certain
functions).
Just as important, however, for present purposes is the
emerging consensus that (a) the devolutionary status quo is
not sustainable in the longer term but equally that (b) there
is a lack of agreement as to what might be done. The
unsustainability derives not from the fearful asymmetry
itself of the current devolution arrangements across the
UK but particular manifestations of that asymmetry in the
shape of problems of, ﬁrst, political representation –
especially in the shape of the West Lothian question;
secondly, resentments, on all sides, of the current model
for the distribution of ﬁnancial resources – the Barnett
formula and all that; thirdly, resentments (I gather) in
England about not just extra funding in Scotland but also
its beneﬁts in terms of free personal care for the elderly,
free university education, and free medical prescriptions
on the way. And, ﬁnally, in a situation exaggerated but not
invented by the election of the new Scottish Government
in 2007, there are insufﬁcient means for the formal
anticipation and resolution of potential disputes between
governments.
On the one side of the debate about ways forward, the
solution is seen in terms of weakening of the Union in the
direction of independence – but with increasingly
sophisticated versions of what independence within
Europe and in association with neighbouring states might
mean. (As a tiny example, I was interested to hear the
other day of SNP proposals to continue to use Swansea for
vehicle licensing after independence.) On the other side,
those whose constitutional policy futures assume the
continuity of the Union have lost sight of a credible vision
of a future Union. Hence the paralysis. There is no
consensus as to what even the minimum requirements of
Union are; in particular, what shared rights of citizens
across the UK there ought to be.
As an aside, there is not even a consensus as to what
governments call each other nowadays. It may have been
lost on many of the overseas guests but it was instructive to
witness the conﬂict at the opening of the Commonwealth
Law Ministers conference in Edinburgh in July of this year
in the ﬁrm references of the Deputy First Minister to her
“Scottish Government” but the Attorney General Baroness
Scotland’s equally deliberate references throughout her
address to her government’s co-operation with the
“Scottish Executive”.
The result is that constitutional reform at the UK level has
to take its place, along with other policy debate in this
highly contested zone. Symptomatic of the contest is the
current turf war between the SNP Government’s National
Conversation about Scotland’s constitutional future and,
on the other hand, the Calman Commission established by
resolution of the Scottish Parliament and with the support
of the UK Government.
The relationship between the two visions of the future can
be expected to be in ﬂux for some time. It is suggested by
some that the SNP goal of a referendum in 2010 may be
undermined by the political fallout from the current
ﬁnancial crisis. Meanwhile the Calman Commission has
issued its interim report. I do not want to discuss its
contents in detail here. It does, in any event, leave most
signiﬁcant questions for further consultation and
consideration. Perhaps, though, its principal signiﬁcance
lies in its robust defence of devolution so far and the
beginning of an exploration of the basis on which the
future of the Union may be best analysed.
My emphasis is to be on problems but before turning to the
more problematic areas, in the interests of balance and
trying to respect an obligation to be more comprehensive
in my public law coverage of “what’s happening in
Scotland”, I should mention some developments (in recent
years) which have been more straightforward. Some
impacts of devolution have been constraining but other
developments have been enabled or at least permitted by
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devolution and they fall into two categories. They are either
in the areas of devolved legislative competence where the
Scottish Parliament has legislated or is proposing to do so;
or they are developments done at the hand of the courts –
not (necessarily) as a consequence of devolution, but
during the era of devolution.
In the ﬁrst category, I would mention two examples – the
ﬁrst being the recently enacted Judiciary and Courts
(Scotland) Act 2008. It is an Act which has a long
prehistory. Proposals for a Bill reached an advanced stage
under the Labour/Liberal Democrat coalition and were
carried forward, since May 2007, by the SNP
Government. It was a Bill which drew quite heavily on the
model of the UK Constitutional Reform Act 2005 but with
its own distinctive characteristics. Now the new Act
provides a statutory guarantee of judicial independence; it
formally establishes the Lord President of the Court of
Session as the Head of the Scottish Judiciary; it puts the
Judicial Appointments Board on a statutory footing and
enacts new rules of judicial conduct and dismissals. It re-
establishes the Scottish Court Service, headed by the Lord
President, as a non-ministerial ofﬁce within the Scottish
Administration.
Where it deals with tribunals to consider the dismissal of
judges, the Act completes a piece of unﬁnished business
under the Scotland Act by replacing rules initially made by
UK ministers in 1999 under that Act.
Other rules of that sort which have taken a long time to
replace are those which laid down procedures for the
making of statutory instruments (in the Scottish
Parliament) – essential from the launch of devolution in
1999. Broadly, the code of the Statutory Instruments Act
1946 was adopted for Scottish SIs. The development of a
new code of Scottish-built rules has been in the hands of
the Subordinate Legislation Committee of the Scottish
Parliament as the principal component of their Regulatory
Framework Inquiry. In Session 2 of the Parliament, the
committee produced some very radical proposals. These
would, in particular, have required drafts of virtually all
SSIs to be laid before the Parliament. More recently in the
3rd Session, the reconstituted committee has produced
some much less adventurous proposals and the Scottish
Government is to adopt these in a Legislative Reform Bill
in the coming months.
A government without a majority in the Parliament is
disabled from engaging in politically controversial
legislative initiatives but progress can be made in areas –
such as those I have mentioned – which are
uncontroversial between the main parties.
Turning to my, equally highly selective, review of
developments in the courts, I’ll be dealing with some
human rights issues in a minute. But I would ﬁrst like to
mention one or two others whose scope is nicely
encapsulated, if I may say so, Chairman, in two extracts
from the speech of Lord Hope of Craighead in Davidson v
Scottish Ministers (No 1) 2006 SC(HL) 41. One is where he
said: “There are occasions when those of your Lordships
who come from Scotland feel justiﬁed in defending Scots
law and the Scottish legal system against what are perceived
to be alien inﬂuences. But this” he said, “is not one of
them” (para 38). Davidson was the case in which the House
of Lords, the Scottish judges in particular, brought the
Scottish and English jurisdictions into alignment (but
without crude assimilation) on the matter of interdicts
against the Crown in judicial review. Whilst some other
areas of judicial review have remained deﬁantly different
including the very scope of that jurisdiction, as deﬁned in
West v Secretary of State for Scotland 1992 SC 385, there have
been other instances of considered realignment. Porter v
Magill [2002] 2 AC 357 was the case in which Lord Hope
resolved earlier divergences on the test for bias or apparent
bias and R (Burkett) v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC [2002]
3 All ER 97 the case in which he sought out the similarities
of approach in principle to questions of delay in initiating
judicial review proceedings. Extra judicially he has
declared his frustration with the relatively restrictive
approach to locus standi in judicial review in Scotland and
sought a convergence between the two jurisdictions in that
area as well (“Mike Tyson comes to Glasgow – A Question
of Standing” [2001] PL 294).
It was also in Davidson that Lord Hope took the
opportunity to observe that judges in the House of Lords
had, he said, “the beneﬁt of examining the issue in a
tribunal which draws its membership from all parts of the
United Kingdom…. There is everything to be gained,” he
said, “by the sharing of views among your Lordships which
it has been possible to enjoy in this case”(para 38). This is
to anticipate the stance which we may expect to be adopted
in the new UK Supreme Court from the autumn of 2009
– an openness, at least in matters of public law, to the
testing of whether rules should or should not have a UK-
wide application.
It would be possible to add footnotes, at this point, in
which might lurk additional references to such things as
Tehrani v Home Secretary 2007 SC(HL) 1 on the IPL
consequences of judicial review; cases which have
conﬁrmed the application of the Carltona principle to acts
of the Scottish Ministers; and another potentially rich area
for development is that of the consequences (post
devolution) of the divisibility of the Crown. This has been
explored recently in great detail in the light of R (on the
application of Quark Fishing Ltd) v Foreign Secretary [2006] 1
AC 529 by Anne Twomey (see “Responsible Government
and the Divisibility of the Crown” [2008] PL 742).
Amongst other things, she discusses the role of the Privy
Council and Privy Counsellors in the making of Orders in
Council – another of those areas in which the complexity
of the devolution arrangements is exposed as UK ministers
tender “advice” on matters within the devolved
competence of the Scottish Government.
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HUMAN RIGHTS
I now want to move on to two of the more contested areas
of constitutional development and to start by saying a few
words about devolution-related aspects of the UK
Government’s UK or British Bill of Rights project. I am
not completely sure where that project is headed just at
present. Things seem to have gone very quiet. There was
an expectation in the summer that a new White Paper was
imminent but there has been no further public sign of this
– except perhaps in reactions to the sudden resignation of
Lord Lester as a government advisor on human rights in
November 2008.
There have, of course, been many other pressing things on
the minds of ministers. But the proposal for a new Bill of
Rights (and probably duties or responsibilities) has been a
project at the centre of the Brown package of
constitutional reforms and it was, it seemed, also at the
centre of the wider “Britishness” project. And one might
have thought that the Britishness theme was one which
would have rung some devolution-sensitive bells in
Whitehall. But there was, in fact, no discussion of
devolution-related aspects of human rights in the reform
Green Paper of July 2007.
In part, this may be simply an example of a failure to take
account of an obvious point of political sensitivity. And, as
an aside, one might note that this is not conﬁned to human
rights matters. In An Elected Second Chamber: Further Reform of
the House of Lords Cm 7438, (July 2008) there is a reference
to the possible future role of religious leaders in a reformed
House. The document (prepared by a Ministry of Justice
into which the Scotland Ofﬁce is said to be integrated as a
“distinct entity”) referred to the presence of Bishops in the
House of Lords as signalling the commitment of successive
governments to “an expression of the relationship between
the Crown, Parliament and the Church that underpins the
fabric of our nation!” (para 6.45 – exclamation mark
added!) (Mind you, devolutionary sensitivities can crop up
in odd places. I am currently in discussion with a large law
publisher about my insistence on a lower case “s” for
schedules to Acts of the Scottish Parliament!)
There was some treatment of the impact of devolution on
any new UK Bill of Rights in the report of the Joint
Committee on Human Rights which was published in
August 2008. My own, rather unhelpful, two-line
submission to the committee had raised questions about
the viability of the project, given the probable need for a
Sewel Motion.
I want to return to the Joint Committee report, but ﬁrst I
should say a few words on Scotland’s experience of (post
1998) human rights law developments so far. It has been
a bit of a bumpy ride – in ways which would not have been
predicted in 1998 when it seemed to be assumed that the
Human Rights Act regime had been quite carefully
enmeshed with that of the Scotland Act to produce an
integrated code. I would pick out four aspects.
1. In the ﬁrst place the engagement of the Scottish
Parliament and Executive with human rights limitations
from their start-up in 1999 (and thus well in advance
of the general HRA commencement date of 2 October
2000) brought the unexpected exposure of the Scottish
criminal courts to human rights challenges, resulting
from the involvement of the Lord Advocate – a
member of the Scottish Executive – as prosecutor and
with the particularly intrusive decision in Starrs v Ruxton
2000 JC 208 that temporary sheriffs were unacceptable
and had to be abolished.
2. A second high-proﬁle consequence of an unexpected
interaction between the Human Rights Act and the
Scotland Act was the divergence which emerged
between the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in
the case of R v HMA 2003 SC(PC)21 and the Appellate
Committee of the House of Lords in AG’s Reference No
2 of 2001 [2004] 2 AC 72 on the question of the
impact of Convention rights on prosecutorial delay in
criminal trials – a divergence which was, however, later
resolved in Spiers v Ruddy 2008 SLT 39.
3. Another occasion for a sharp divergence – this time
between the Inner House of the Court of Session and
the House of Lords – came in Somerville v Scottish
Ministers 2008 SC(HL) 45 where a particularly strong
difference of opinion arose over whether the 12-month
time ban on proceedings under the HRA should also
apply to proceedings brought as a devolution issue
against the Scottish Executive under the Scotland Act.
And the result has been, through the decision of the
House of Lords in the case, that it does not. Somerville
brought conﬂicting interpretations of the two Acts too
complex to explore fully here but which, put crudely,
forced a choice between the logic of similarity of
treatment under the two human rights codes – which
had attracted the Inner House to a 12-month rule
common to both – and, on the other hand, the logic of
treating the human rights challenge as one of several
which might be brought as competence issues under
the Scotland Act where, quite plainly, no general 12
month rule applied – the view which, on its
interpretation of that Act, attracted a majority in the
House of Lords (for discussion see C Himsworth,
“Conﬂicting Interpretations of a Relationship:
Damages for Human Rights Breaches” 2008 (12) Ed
LR 321).
4. I should mention one quite separate human rights
development with a devolutionary twist to it. There
has, I think, been no opportunity for a Scottish court to
engage with the question of what constitutes a “public
authority” – a “person certain of whose functions are
functions of a public nature” – for the purposes of
section 6 (3) of the HRA. But, in the light of L v
Birmingham City Council [2008] 1AC 95 the opportunity
was taken in section 145 of the Westminster Health
and Social Care Act 2008 to amend not only the
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England and Wales statute but also the Social Work
(Scotland) Act 1968 to ensure that private providers
become subject to the HRA. Those who keep an eye
on these things will have noted that, although the
Health and Social Care Bill was the subject of a
legislative consent motion in the Scottish Parliament,
the clause which became section 145 was not – perhaps
because it was simply a late amendment to the Bill, but
perhaps because it was thought not to be within the
competence of the Parliament.
I mention these human rights developments mainly to
remind that the quest for compliance with Convention
rights has brought some quite difﬁcult consequences –
many of them unforeseen – for the working of the human
rights settlement so far. To talk now of whether and, if so,
how to superimpose a new form of UK or British Bill of
Rights revives these questions of compatibility between the
human rights and devolution regimes. Some of these
questions are narrow and technical. Some of them are
broader questions about the legislative competence of the
Scottish Parliament.
Let me try to illustrate the difﬁculties which arise by
reference to the Joint Committee report I have already
mentioned. The committee came to Edinburgh and took
evidence from the Scottish Government’s Cabinet
Secretary for Justice, Mr Kenny MacAskill, and
representatives of the Law Society of Scotland. The
committee also took evidence on Northern Ireland where
arguably the problems involved in talking about a new and
explicitly British or UK Bill of Rights which could disrupt
the delicate understandings underpinning the Belfast
Agreement of 1998 might loom much larger than anything
thrown up by Scotland.
I have two principal comments on the committee’s
response to their encounters with evidence from Scotland
and Northern Ireland. The ﬁrst is to note the committee’s
correct insistence on the need for communication between
the UK Government and the devolved administrations.
Kenny MacAskill had been asked about the extent to which
the Scottish Government had been involved in discussions
on a Bill of Rights. He said:
“Not really a great deal at all and I think the fact that
devolution is not mentioned is perhaps an indicator of that”.
The UK Justice Secretary had accepted in evidence that the
government had, he said, “to ensure that what we say does
not collide with the devolution settlement and, if there is a
question of that, it has the consent of the devolved
administrations”. The committee agreed: “A UK Bill of
Rights must be based on a detailed dialogue between
central government and the devolved administrations. We
note that this dialogue does not yet seem to have begun”
(paras 103-04).
And later the committee repeated the need for “early
engagement” with the devolved administrations. This was,
in part, in response to the UK Justice Secretary’s view that
there were “tricky” drafting questions rather than matters
of principle arising from the devolution settlement.
My own second comment on the committee’s report,
however, is to doubt whether it is simply drafting questions
which are involved. The committee’s own broad
conclusion on the dimensions of the devolution-related
problems was as follows:
“The devolution settlement creates certain difficulties for a UK
Bill of Rights, but we do not accept that it creates an
insuperable obstacle to such a Bill. Ever since the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, human rights norms have
gradually become embedded at global, regional and national
level. Provided the hierarchy between these levels is clear, there
is a positive virtue in the broadly defined rights in the
international standards being fleshed out into more concrete
norms and standards at the regional, national and sub-
national level. Each Bill of Rights, from the global through
the regional to the national and sub-national levels, becomes
more specific and detailed in its provisions, and is free to be
more generous but must not fall below the minimum floor of
the higher level of protection. It is common for federated
states, such as Canada, the US and Germany, to have both
federal Bills of Rights and state-level Bills of Rights, and for
any questions about the hierarchical relationship between
these different levels of rights protection to be resolved by the
federation’s Constitutional Court. In our view,” the committee
continued, “the devolution settlement creates fewer difficulties
than face federated states in this respect, because
constitutional matters, including human rights, are not
devolved matters” (para 107).
“Nevertheless”, they said, “devolution raises complex issues,
particularly if a UK Bill of Rights concerned devolved matters”
(para 108).
Professor Carol Harlow of the London School of
Economics had argued:
“Human rights are not, of course, a devolved issue, a division
of functions that perhaps remains largely uncontroversial so
long as the matter is governed by the Convention and our
shared heritage in that respect. Were this to change and more
particularly if a proposed new text were to penetrate deeply
into economic and social rights, devolved areas would be
involved…. Whether further regionalisation is desirable and
what the relationship of regional texts could be with the
ECHR and Strasbourg courts are very difficult and delicate
questions” (para 121).
The committee went on to say that they had received some
helpful evidence from the Law Society of Scotland about
the difﬁculties of a UK Bill of Rights in a Scottish context.
Some well known civil rights south of the border, such as
the right to trial by jury, were not, they conceded, part of
Scotland’s constitutional heritage (para 122). In addition,
an amendment to the Scotland Act 1998 would be
required to ensure that provisions of a UK Bill of Rights
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relating to devolved matters could not be repealed or
derogated from by the Scottish Parliament (para123).
In response, I do very much agree about the problems
which might arise if newly deﬁned “rights” promulgated at
a UK level began to impinge on those areas of social policy
currently devolved to the Scottish Parliament – whether or
not they are in areas where Scotland’s “constitutional
heritage” has been different from that of other parts of the
United Kingdom. There would, at the very least, be the
problem of protecting them from future modiﬁcation or
derogation by the Scottish Parliament. I’ll come back to
that but there are bigger problems.
The ﬁrst is the conclusion by both Professor Harlow and
the committee that human rights are not devolved matters.
The main difﬁculty here is that, in terms of the Scotland
Act, the conclusion is simply not technically correct. For a
matter to be “not devolved”, it must be reserved and there
is no indication in Schedule 5 to the Act that this is the
case. Certain “constitutional” matters are reserved but
these are contained in a closed list which does not refer to
human rights. There is a reservation of “equality”/non-
discrimination rights but this does not extend to human
rights in general. When the Scottish Commission for
Human Rights was created by the Scottish Parliament care
was taken not to impinge on the reserved equality matters
just as there had been a sensitivity to the Scottish devolved
areas in the creation of the UK Equality Commission. But
no one would have challenged the competence of the
Scottish Parliament to legislate on human rights in general.
It is true that the Human Rights Act 1998 joins other
statutes (mainly large parts of the Scotland Act itself) which
cannot, by virtue of Schedule 4, be modiﬁed by the
Scottish Parliament but a Bill in the UK Parliament
designed to repeal or amend or replace the Human Rights
Act would, I assume, require a legislative consent (Sewel)
motion in the Scottish Parliament because of the Bill’s
encroachment on devolved matters – both in respect of its
touching on human rights at all and, if this were the case,
its extension into other aspects of devolved legislative
competence such as criminal justice or education or
housing policy.
Nor is this simply a technical matter of getting a legislative
consent motion approved (or not) by the Scottish
Parliament. Of course, that is, in any event, a matter of mere
convention rather than law. But this is where the line in
the Joint Committee’s report about an amendment to the
Scotland Act being required and the cheerful reference to
the devolution settlement’s creating “fewer difﬁculties than
face federated states” become problematic. Of course, in
a formal sense, the sovereignty of the UK Parliament could
in theory be asserted in a way that would not be the case
in a federation but, to say this, is to ignore the
constitutional realities of the UK to which I have referred.
We have to bear in mind that in Mr MacAskill’s evidence to
the Joint Committee, he spoke not only of a lack of
communication between governments but also of his own
general antipathy to the project. In answer to the straight
question of whether a UK Bill of Rights was needed, his
one-word answer was a simple “no”.
On the matter of a UK or British Bill of Rights, I would
predict a very difﬁcult future.
SUPREME COURTS
I move on now to my second principal area of
constitutional development selected for treatment, the UK
Supreme Court.
But before I discuss the “top court” proper let me go off
on another small devolutionary excursion in relation to the
Scottish legal system more widely. Two issues come
together as aspects of the jurisdictional asymmetry exposed
by devolution (see CMG Himsworth, “Devolution and its
Jurisdictional Asymmetries” (2007) 70 MLR 31).
One is the general question of tribunal reform in Scotland.
The Leggatt review acknowledged the complications
caused by devolution and the resulting division of the
Scottish system into devolved and non-devolved tribunals.
And the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 did
not intervene to reform devolved tribunals. Since then,
however, the Administrative Justice Steering Group has
reported, with options for the future organisation of
tribunals in Scotland including, most ambitiously, a single
Scottish Tribunal service embracing both devolved and
reserved tribunals – in the same way that the devolved
system of courts handles both devolved and reserved
matters.
To make that comparison with courts touches on another
area of more speciﬁc current sensitivity. One change that
was made by the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act
2007 and which did affect Scotland was the provision (in ss
20-21) for the transfer of judicial review applications from
the Court of Session to the new Upper Tribunal. Now it
may be that in England and Wales such a transfer can be
treated as a fairly easily accommodated adjustment of the
court and tribunal systems. In Scotland, however, there is
an inevitable sensitivity about the idea of the transfer of
business from being handled within the supervisory
jurisdiction of the Court of Session to a new home in a UK
tribunal. The misgivings hardly need to be articulated. In
terms of section 20 of the 2007 Act such transfers cannot
currently include applications to the supervisory
jurisdiction which challenge decisions under the
Immigration Acts. But in the Border Agency consultation
on immigration appeals of August 2008 the proposal is
made (as for the English High Court) to remove the
immigration case restrictions – whilst stating that the
Agency, referring to Lord Gill’s review of civil justice,
remains open minded as to exactly how judicial reviews
will be handled in Scotland”. To which one might say: “So
they should”. But, as the Agency also insists, immigration
is not a devolved matter but within their reserved domain.
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And there has already been some quite intrusive
intervention into Scottish court practice to accommodate,
for instance, the “special representatives” required by the
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. Whatever the eventual
outcome and whatever its rights and wrongs, here have
been signs that the Border Agency’s consultation has been
alarmingly narrow so far.
The problem about how to handle both tribunal reform
and the changes being made to judicial review is that there
are evident difﬁculties which arise from the administration
of some reserved areas of policy through a legal system
which is devolved and, therefore, beyond the direct control
of the central government.
Returning speciﬁcally to the UK Supreme Court, I want
to make a couple of further points.
The ﬁrst is to remind of the unhappy launch of the
constitutional reform project in the aftermath of the Lord
Chancellor (abolition of) announcement in June 2003.
Suddenly, so suddenly, we gather, that even existing Law
Lords were caught unawares, in an associated reform, the
Appellate Committee was to be replaced by a new UK
Supreme Court. Inevitably great sensitivities were raised
and doubts expressed and, as the Constitutional Reform
Bill proceeded, one result was that the clause protective of
the separateness of the UK jurisdictions was incorporated.
It was certainly not the right climate for the serious
consideration of whether, for instance, there might be
greater uniformity of appellate jurisdictions across the UK.
The apparent oddity in the supreme court of a state in its
having a shared civil jurisdiction but an asymmetry in
criminal appeals was retained. Perhaps this is, in any event,
the right way forward but alternatives were undiscussable
and only those criminal matters which are raised as
“devolution matters” will reach the Supreme Court when
it absorbs the current jurisdiction of the JCPC. Similarly
the rules on access to the court remain on an asymmetric
basis which leaves Scotland with access as of right once the
case is certiﬁed – a situation which gave rise to some
embarrassment because of the risk of abuse in Wilson v
Jaymarke Estates Ltd 2007 SC(HL) 135.
What was quite apparent at the time of the debates on the
Constitutional Reform Bill was that there were, within
Scotland and in ways that did not simply divide Nationalists
and Unionists, quite different perceptions of what
purposes a UK Supreme Court might serve. Broadly there
was a division between those who see the House of Lords
and Supreme Court as providing a service to the Scottish
legal system and those who see it as having an explicit UK-
wide responsibility to resolve the biggest legal questions in
the state as a whole.
Perhaps of more continuing signiﬁcance in a devolutionary
context is my second Supreme Court point which focuses
on the competence of the Scottish Parliament. Ever since
the Scotland Act was passed there has been speculation
about whether the Parliament could itself competently
abolish appeals from Scotland to the House of Lords.
But then, in 2004, in the course of a debate on the Sewel
Motion on the Constitutional Reform Bill it was
reconﬁrmed that it was the policy of the SNP to repatriate
Scottish appeals and to abolish appeals to the House of
Lords or UK Supreme Court.
The issue was given a more concrete form when, in 2006,
a Bill – a Member’s Bill promoted by Adam Ingram MSP
– was introduced which would have abolished House of
Lords appeals but, at the same time, established a new Civil
Appeals Committee in Scotland. However, that Bill quickly
ran into difﬁculties. The Presiding Ofﬁcer of the
Parliament issued his statement on legislative competence
and declared several provisions of the Bill to be beyond
competence on the grounds of encroachment on the
reserved matter of the Constitution and incompatibility
with Convention rights. There has been criticism of the
lack of any requirement in the Scotland Act that the
content of the legal advice to the Presiding Ofﬁcer be
published but, in any event, in this case, the consequence
of the statement was that the Parliament took advantage of
procedures available under its Standing Orders to prevent
further progress on the Bill. The indignant opposition of
Adam Ingram – including attempts on his part to call in aid
supportive views known to have been expressed by tutors
in the Law School at the University of Edinburgh – was
overridden by the then coalition government’s
parliamentary majority.
Since May 2007, of course, that is a position which has
changed. Adam Ingram is now a minister in the SNP
Scottish Government. That government does not have an
overall majority in the Parliament but it might well be that
support from other parties would be forthcoming. Another
Civil Appeals Bill may be some way away yet but it seems
likely, on the record of events so far, that initial steps in the
direction of a new Bill may not be far away. (A few days
after this lecture was delivered it was announced on
December 15, 2008 by the Scottish Government that a
research project led by Professor Neil Walker to review
ﬁnal civil appeals in Scotland was to be launched). The UK
Supreme Court will go ahead in October 2009 but there
may yet be, from the devolved Government of Scotland, a
counter project in the making.
And, as I implied earlier, it might well be a counter project
which would attract support, not just from other political
parties but also from others who simply have a less centrist
view of what top courts are supposed to do.
In conclusion, what are we to make of the developments I
have so brieﬂy surveyed? The devolution years have brought
two different visions of future development. I make no
personal judgment here on the pros and cons of the
political divide between those who would strengthen and
those who would weaken the Union. For the time being,
however, we have the Union and, just as the political
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conditions for the sustainability of the Union have to be
worked out if it is to continue effectively and the barriers to
a working Union have to be removed (currently the Calman
Commission’s project), so too we have to take account of
the more speciﬁcally legal characteristics of devolution
within the Union. And, as I have tried to show, there have
been contributions at the hands of both legislatures and
courts in the direction of sustainable coexistence but there
are also some areas where developments have been much
more fraught. The lack of an agreed vision of what
devolution under the Union entails threatens progress. As a
result, two principal projects at the UK level – the UK Bill
of Rights project and the creation of the UK Supreme
Court – face substantial challenge.
(In March 2009, the UK and Scottish Governments agreed
on a strategy to amend the Scotland Act 1998 to insert a
12-month time limit on human rights claims. In the same
month, the UK Government published its Green Paper
Rights and responsibilities: developing our constitutional framework
(Cm 7577)).
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The ﬁnancial market crisis continues to unfold and has raised important questions about the rule of law
and the scope and intensity of regulation in ﬁnancial markets. The effective operation of ﬁnancial markets
requires clear legal rules ﬁrmly embedded in a principled framework of private and public-law
governance. In recent years, the role of law in ﬁnancial markets has evolved substantially and in many
ways has reﬂected changes in other areas of economic and social life. Regulating competing rights and
interests among ﬁnancial institutions, consumers and the broader economy has created many challenges
that have tested the resilience of the ﬁnancial system. The conference will provide a forum for academics
and policymakers to address these challenges by exchanging ideas and research on issues concerning the
role of law in ﬁnancial market governance and institutional development. The issues will be addressed
from an international and comparative dimension, along with inter-disciplinary contributions from other
social scientists, with a view to developing a better understanding of how to use legal rules and principles
to build more efﬁcient and stable ﬁnancial markets.
Topics proposed to be addressed at the conference will include (but are not restricted to)
• Changing structure of ﬁnancial markets, externalities and the rule of law
• The scope of ﬁnancial market regulation and the risks of a sectoral approach
• Redesigning banking law to enhance crisis management
• Comparative company law and corporate governance
• Investor and policyholder protection and the role of regulation
• Private law aspects of ﬁnancial policy reform
• International economic law, ﬁnancial stability, and international soft law
• Alternative legal systems: Sharia law and Chinese law
• Institutional design of ﬁnancial markets and regulation
• The effectiveness of regional and international harmonization
• The design of enforcement structures
Submission of papers: April 30 was set as the date by which potential paper presenters should submit
either a draft of the paper or a detailed outline or abstract, with preference given to in draft form. The
ﬁnal version of the papers to be submitted at the conference will be due on May 30 (all queries to
Belinda.Crothers@sas.ac.uk). Further information on the workshop and this year’s programme can be
obtained from the IALS website (www.ials.sas.ac.uk).
